During a lifeboat drill at sea in good weather conditions, the starboard lifeboat was lowered to the embarkation deck. In this operation the top link of the forward chain for the connection between the davit floating block and the hook on the lifeboat parted, such that the entire load from the lifeboat was transferred to the aft hook/chain. As the aft chain could not withstand the excessive weight, the lifeboat accidentally dropped to the sea.
The ship was banned in Italy in 2002. The banning was lifted in December 2007 and the vessel was on a voyage to Port of Szczecin in Poland. After lifting the ship from banning, she was due for a Mandatory Expanded Inspection (MEI). The Mandatory Expanded PSC PMoU Inspection was carried out on 19 December 2007 on partly discharged ship in Szczecin – Poland by two of our PSC Officers. After the inspection the ship was detained having among other 27 deficiencies identified.
During maneuvering, the a vessel experienced a burst starting air pipe. This resulted in non-availability of the slow speed large bore main engine which caused the subsequent grounding of the Vessel.
This incident refers to a broken rudderstock due to corrosion fatigue. While at sea, the steering failed to respond. Investigations revealed that the rudder was not ίn the position as indicated by the rudder angle indicator on the bridge and in the steering gear room. An underwater inspection was carried out and the rudder was found to have an angle of 90 degrees to port. The rudder was temporarily secured, and the vessel was subsequent!y towed to the port for close-up inspection in dry-dock and for permanent repairs.
The present publication is an effort to gather and summarize all new IMO regulations that entered or are to enter into force during 2013. Active links to relevant documents/circulars/resolutions have been also included to make it easier for the reader to have a direct reference to the actual text of each regulation, or to documents analyzing the regulatory requirements.
This investigation report by the US Minerals Management Service (MMS) was conducted in conjunction with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) and is referring to several pollution events were reported in the Main Pass Block 288 area GoM, over a three-week time period beginning 31 May 2007. On 31 May 2007, the National Response Center (NRC) received a report that indicated a 350-foot by 100-foot oil slick had been sighted in the Main Pass Block 288 area. In the following three weeks, four additional oil slicks of various sizes, color, and consistency were reported in the same area. On 23 June 2007, a major spill (the Spill) was reported to NRC in a subsequent report. The Spill covered an area 30 miles in length by 6 miles wide and was later estimated to be comprised of 187 barrels (bbls) of oil.
This incident refers to cracks identified in a vessel’s propeller hub. When carrying out hull renewal survey in drydock, two open cracks were found during the visual inspection of the propeller hub. The propeller was a 4 bladed mono-block fixed pitch manganese aluminium bronze propeller fitted with cone and key and with diameter: 5205 mm.
Upon survey of all cargo holds after a transport of sulphur cargo, serious corrosion was found. On the inclined plates of the hopper tanks and the lower stool of the transverse bulkhead, extensive damage in shape of groove corrosion was found with depth up to 9mm in places. This incident information refers to a 17,427 GRT Bulk Carrier in 1997.
When boarding the ship, the PSCO immediately noticed clear grounds for a more detailed inspection of the ship’s safety standard and general condition. The PSCO found that the maintenance of especially the accommodation and the ship’s deck areas were so poor that the ship should be considered substandard.
Photo credit: Shipspotting
On the morning of May 19, 2000, a contract employee was using a portable of Accident winch (come-along) to remove a section of removable guardrail for the purpose of accommodating the installation of the mounting beams of a temporary crane. One end of the come-along was attached to the section of guardrail to be removed, while the other end was attached to a section of fixed guardrail located approximately 5 feet above the guardrail to be removed. As tension was applied to the come-along, the upper guardrail failed at its base welds and detached from the deck. As a result of the detachment, the employee fell approximately 60 feet to the Plus 10 deck and sustained fatal injuries.
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Officer of the Watch 