blowout – Officer of the Watch

Offshore Platform Blowout – Investigation Report

December 30, 2013 by Officer of the Watch Leave a Comment

This incident refers to a a brief loss of well control that occurred onboard an offshore platform in the Gulf of Mexico a few years ago. The operator was attempting to pull the tubing free of the seal assembly in a Baker SC-2 packer set at 10,830 feet to repair the Surface Controlled Subsurface Safety Valve (SCSSV) set at 350 feet (RKB) or 232 feet below mud line. In the attempt to retrieve the hanger, the 2 7/8-inch, P-105 tubing parted at approximately 4300 feet while working the pipe up and down. The 2 7/8-inch tubing began getting pushed out of the hole by well pressure and fluid in the annulus began flowing.

Blowout and Subsequent Fire On Offshore Platform – Investigation Report

December 23, 2013 by Officer of the Watch Leave a Comment

This incident took place almost a decade ago and refers to a rig blowout and the subsequent fire that broke on the platform. Initially the Rig was conducting directional drilling operations. After a stand being pulled the well began flowing at an increasing rate. The annular diverter element was closed and the well was put into the diverter system. The alarm was sounded to evacuate the Rig and Platform. After a while the end of the port diverter pipe blew off and an uncontrolled flow of gas, water, sand, and hydrocarbons caught fire. The fire from the uncontrolled flow out of the diverter was spread on the Rig floor.

Blowout and Consequent Fire onboard Offshore Platform – Investigation Report

November 18, 2013 by Officer of the Watch Leave a Comment

This investigation report refers to an accident that took place during an attempt to weld the casing head of a slip-on wellhead, gas flow was noticed coming from the +10 valve. Later, unsuccessful attempts were made to stop the flow, which was then coming from the drive pipe/surface casing annular region. The gas flow eventually ignited and caused extensive damage to the platform. The well bridged over and kill operations were completed successfully and fortunately there were no injuries.

The Probability of an Offshore Accident

August 6, 2013 by Officer of the Watch Leave a Comment

Risk is the product of frequency and consequence. Accordingly, high consequence events which occur infrequently may contribute as much risk as frequent events which have smaller consequences. Estimating the frequency with which events occur is as important to overall risk as accurately predicting the consequences. One way of estimating frequency is to look at historical records. The information presented below are an abstract from the “Safety of offshore oil & gas Impact Assessment Annex I” working paper from the European Commission, published in 2011 to accompany the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament on safety of offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and production activities.

Potential Costs of an Offshore Accident

July 16, 2013 by Officer of the Watch Leave a Comment

The negative impacts of an accident are hard to quantify precisely, they will of course depend on the type, the scale, the time and the location of the event. In the case of an oil spill, its duration and the type of the oil will also have a major impact. The costs of an offshore accident will include costs to the operator (damage to the installation, lost oil, containment, cleanup, litigation etc.) and third-party costs to victims, to natural resources, the government and the affected individuals/businesses (including lost income). The information presented below are an abstract from the “Safety of offshore oil & gas Impact Assessment Annex I” working paper from the European Commission, published in 2011 to accompany the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament on safety of offshore oil and gas prospection, exploration and production activities.

Offshore Well Blowout – Investigation Report

April 15, 2013 by Officer of the Watch Leave a Comment

A blowout occurred on a Well during the period from May 9 to May 18, 2001, after the 13⅜–inch surface casing was cemented. The mobile offshore drilling unit (MODU) was cantilevered over “Platform A.” The plan called for the well to be directionally drilled with a drift angle of approximately 55 degrees. On May 8, 2001, after the 13⅜-inch surface casing was cemented, a slight flow was noted coming from the annulus between the surface casing and the 18⅝-inch conductor casing. The diverter was closed and pressure started increasing on the annulus. Valves and piping were rigged up to the 18⅝-inch A section to permit monitoring of pressure and transport of fluids to and from the annulus. Throughout the night of May 8 and through 0730 hrs on May 10, unsuccessful attempts were made to bleed off the annular pressure.

Lessons from the Deepwater Horizon Incident

February 14, 2013 by Officer of the Watch Leave a Comment

The following article was initially published in SAFETY4SEA by Apostolos Belokas Managing Editor of SAFETY4SEA. On January the 3rd of 2006 the US Authorities released the investigation report of the M/T Bow Mariner investigation. It was a shocking thing to read throughout the report and realize that many items were found to be out of order. Let aside the key finding : Root cause of the incident was the failure of the operator to properly implement SMS. Five years later, same day the US Authorities released the preliminary report of the findings of the investigation of the Deepwater Horizon Incident.